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MILITARY PRIVATIZATION: EFFICIENCY OR ANARCHY? 
MARK CALAGUAS? 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States’ military invasion of Iraq generated a great deal of controversy in the 
international community even before its commencement in the spring of 2003, and the increasing 
use of private military contractors has been one point of contention.  On March 31, 2004, four 
contractors employed by Blackwater U.S.A. were hired as guards to escort four empty trucks to 
pick up kitchen equipment at a military installation.  While en route, the hired guards were 
ambushed and brutally killed near the town of Fallujah.1  The guards were savagely beaten, 
killed, and strung up on a bridge spanning the Euphrates River.2  Both the gruesomeness of the 
deaths and the identities of the victims captivated the millions of people worldwide who saw 
news broadcasts of this tragic event.  Although the international community already was 
accustomed to regular reports of military casualties, the Fallujah incident boldly illustrated the 
fact that “[i]n no conflict has the civilian footprint supporting military operations been larger 
than in Iraq.”3 
This paper will provide a general overview of the private military contracting industry, 
articulate the problems arising from the outsourcing of military functions to civilian contractors, 
and hopefully offer some solutions to those problems.  Part I traces the factors leading to the 
proliferation of private military contractors.  Section A discusses the current dependence of the 
U.S. military on private military contractors in fulfilling its obligations around the world.  
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Section B then explores the benefits of contracting and also examines the serious consequences 
posed by the way military-civilian partnerships have been executed in recent years, particularly 
in Iraq.  Part II highlights some of the significant holes in the current regulatory scheme and 
provides some remedies to ensure effective coordination and accountability. 
I. THE RISE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 
A. The History and Current U.S. Dependence on Private Military Contractors  
 
 Private military contractors can be roughly divided into three categories based on the 
companies’ primary functions: (1) logistical support firms; (2) private security firms; and (3) 
private military companies.4  Logistical support firms, such as the Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg 
Brown & Root (KBR), handle basic, non-military operations like providing laundry services, 
catering, sanitation, and transportation personnel.5  Private security firms, such as Blackwater 
U.S.A, the company that employed the guards who were killed in Fallujah, supply protection to 
various groups and individuals carrying out reconstruction efforts as well as to various 
government officials and installations.6   
Perhaps the most controversial of all private military contractors are the private military 
firms,7 which provide military training and even combat services to their clients.8  Executive 
Outcomes, a private military firm based in South Africa, garnered notoriety during the 1990s for 
training Angola’s armed forces and for playing a pivotal role in the suppression of rebel 
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movements in the Ivory Coast.9  An American company based out of Virginia, Military 
Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), provided training to the Croatian army in April 
1995; that army launched a (perhaps not-so-) surprisingly effective offensive against Serbian 
forces shortly thereafter.10  These activities, along with stories of human rights abuses 
perpetrated by certain contractors, have done much to shape the public image of private military 
contracting and have led to charges that private military firms are nothing more than bands of 
thugs operating as modern-day mercenaries.11  The potential for abuse through the use of private 
military firms is a major cause for concern.  The sheer breadth of services currently provided by 
private military contractors illustrates the ever-increasing power these companies have over the 
ability of countries to make war and keep peace.12   
The rise of private military contractors began with the fall of Communism, as the end of 
the Cold War changed the structure of military forces around the world.13  One factor leading to 
the use of private military contractors was   the decline in demand for regular military personnel 
following the Cold War, thus reversing a decades-long trend of military buildup.14  One 
commentator, P.W. Singer, likens the Cold War militarization to an extended period of 
hyperinflation: once governments, particularly those located in the former Communist bloc, 
realized they no longer required such bloated fighting forces, a worldwide glut of underemployed 
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soldiers resulted.15  Governmental downsizing thus freed up these personnel to utilize their skills 
and training in the private market.16 
 In addition to an influx of new soldiers, the global marketplace also experienced an 
enormous release of weaponry into channels of commerce.17  In the process of military 
downsizing, governments quickly sold off arms to raise desperately needed funds.18  Former 
members of the U.S.S.R. and assorted Soviet satellite nations were the main suppliers of these 
weapons.  Indeed, German reunification resulted in “essentially a huge yard sale of weaponry, 
where nearly every weapon in the East German arsenal was sold, most of it to private bidders at 
cut-rate prices.”19  This arms sale was not limited to high-ticket items like missile systems and 
tanks, but also included light weapons such as grenades, machine guns, and land mines.20  
Increased access to incredibly destructive weapons meant that governments began to lose their 
monopoly on the means of warfare, thus enabling a wider variety of private actors to pose greater 
threats to peace and stability.21 
 Once Cold War politics faded into the background, local conflicts began to skyrocket as 
once-dormant tensions reignited, exploding into bloody clashes waged by combatants who now 
possessed an unprecedented access to weapons and knowledge.22  The origins of these conflicts 
ranged from the reopening of old wounds between various ethnic groups in the Balkans to the 
implosion of weakened states such as Somalia and Sierra Leone.23  This disintegration of law and 
order in turn provided an opportunity for non-state actors such as terrorist networks, drug cartels, 
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and guerilla movements to expand their influence and consolidate power.24  Indeed, a number of 
conflicts that have sprung up in recent years appear to be motivated less by purely ideological 
reasons than by economic motives.25  Such conflicts, wherein the casus belli effectively is 
divorced from strong notions of national loyalty, attract enormous attention from private parties 
who look to profit personally rather than to effectuate a specific political goal.26 
 While more and more career soldiers began hanging out their shingles mainly as a result 
of the market conditions brought on by the fall of the Iron Curtain, this trend was also 
exacerbated by the privatization revolution that began sweeping national governments in the 
closing decades of the twentieth century.27  In Britain, the Thatcher administration’s rise to 
power in 1979 led to the denationalization of state-owned industries in the U.K., which helped 
revitalize the stagnant British economy.28  The trend toward privatization eventually spread to 
countries across the globe, abetted by institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank.29   
The United States felt the effects of privatization in a variety of ways; both Republican 
and Democratic leaders began delegating a wide range of government activities to private 
bidders.30  Accordingly, the U.S. earmarked its national defense activities as early targets for 
privatization.31  On a broader cultural scale, privatization impacted numerous areas of civil 
society, including domestic security.  Concurrent with the rise of private military security 
companies, during the 1990s domestic security contractors began providing protection to a wide 
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range of clients, from gated residential communities to nuclear power plants.32  Similarly, the 
business practice of outsourcing became an increasingly popular tool for corporations looking to 
trim the fat by contracting out non-essential activities to less expensive service providers 
abroad.33  All of these factors have contributed to the elevation of the private sector in the 
contemporary imagination: 
“Public” – in such terms as “public schools,” “public housing,” or “public 
transportation” – is synonymous for many with second-rate or cheap.  At the same 
time, there has been a reevaluation of public servants.  In what’s been called the 
“Fall of the Public Man,” the commercial world has been judged superior and is 
more respected.34 
 
 While changing tides in international relations and government spending have fostered 
the growth of private industry, the U.S. military has found itself increasingly dependent on 
private contractors as a result of technological innovations by civilians.35  In particular, advances 
in information technology have required the military to seek outside help.36  More generally, 
civilian ingenuity, coupled with the rapid pace of development, has endowed non-state entities 
with greater access to technology than the government.37  Complex weapons systems maintained 
by private companies on behalf of the military include: the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, the F-117 
Nighthawk stealth fighter jet, the KC-10 refueling plane, the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, the M1 
Abrams tank, and the TOW missile system.38  In addition to collecting and analyzing intelligence 
                                                 
32 Id. at 69. 
33 Id. at 68. 
34 Id. at 70. 
35 Interview by FRONTLINE with Steven Schooner, Law Professor, George Washington School of Law and Former 
Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement Policy (May 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/interviews/schooner.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2005).  
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37 Id. at 63. 
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International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521, 522 (2004). 
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using remote sensors, civilians also operate the Global Hawk and Predator unmanned aerial 
vehicles.39   
One of the reasons why employees of private companies wield such control over these 
types of equipment is that “most military personnel lack the aptitude or length of service to 
develop the requisite skills” to maintain and operate these machines.40  Furthermore, the 
government is unable to take advantage of economies of scale in training individuals to operate 
certain weapon systems because so few of these systems exist.41  Instead of spending an 
inordinate amount of money to provide its own personnel with the requisite training, the military 
will often opt for “package deals,” contracts that bundle private training and support services 
with the initial purchase of weapons systems.42  Thus, the march of technology effectively has 
enabled the growing reality that military privatization may in fact be a necessity to overshadow 
the argument that it might be cheaper for the military to use private contractors. 
 Currently, the impact of private military contractors is most evident in the U.S. 
reconstruction of Iraq.  As of June 2005, fifty thousand contractors, all employed by KBR and 
most hailing from developing countries, provide support and logistics services, such as weather 
forecasting, food preparation, carpentry, and mechanical work.43  Twenty thousand more are 
non-Iraqi security contractors, five to ten thousand of which are American, European, Russian, 
and South African.44  An additional fifteen thousand security contractors are local Iraqis, mostly 
hired by Erinys, a British security company charged with guarding oil facilities.45  In addition, 
forty to seventy thousand contractors, mostly Americans employed by corporations such as 
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General Electric, Bechtel and Parsons, are engaged in the actual rebuilding of Iraq.46  These 
figures are especially striking considering that in June of 2005 total U.S. troop strength in Iraq 
was about 135,000 (by October 2005, the number rose to 152,000).47  
 In the midst of all this activity, several private military contractors have stood out for 
their prominent roles in the Iraq reconstruction process.  Aegis Defence Services, a British 
security company, was awarded a $292 million contract in May 2004 to coordinate security 
throughout Iraq, including within Iraq’s high-profile Green Zone.48  The CEO of Aegis, a former 
Scots Guard colonel named Tim Spicer, remains a contentious figure because of his previous 
work with the Sandline security firm.49  Aegis is facing renewed controversy after one of its 
former employees posted, on a personal website, a video of Baghdad motorists apparently being 
shot for entertainment.50  Another British company, Erinys, is carrying out a $50 million contract 
to protect the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and a $100 million contract to guard Iraqi oil 
fields.51   
 Blackwater U.S.A currently guards U.S. State Department personnel and was previously 
hired to protect Ambassador Paul Bremer, who headed the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) until June 2004.52  In addition to employing the contractors who were killed in Fallujah, 
Blackwater also succeeded in defending the CPA headquarters in Najaf when eight of 
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47  Michael E. O'Hanlon & Nina Kamp, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-
Saddam Iraq, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 21, 2005), available at 
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49 Id. 
50 Press Release, Aegis Defence Systems, Aegis Investigates Iraq Video Clips (Nov. 28, 2005), available at 
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51 FRONTLINE, Who are the Contractors?, supra note 5. 
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Blackwater’s guards headed off an attack by Iraqi militia members.53  The families of the 
contractors who were killed in Fallujah have filed a wrongful death action against Blackwater, 
alleging that the company breached its contract by not providing an adequate number of guards 
to accompany the convoy.54  However, determining ultimate accountability will probably be 
difficult because Blackwater’s contract to escort the convoy was made with a Kuwaiti caterer 
through another contract with a Cypriot company.55 
 Perhaps the most well-known contractor, Halliburton, operates under its subsidiary KBR 
and is noted for the extremely lucrative contracts it has been able to secure with the U.S. 
government.56  KBR currently is the military’s main supplier in Iraq, performing $12 billion 
worth of services to U.S. armed forces.57  These services can be divided roughly into two 
contracts: the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program and the Restore Iraqi Oil contract.58  The 
2001 Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract obligates KBR to provide 
logistics and infrastructure support to U.S. forces worldwide for ten years.59  The services 
include food preparation, laundry, sanitation and utilities.60  The controversial Restore Iraqi Oil 
(RIO) contract, which was negotiated before the U.S. invasion of Iraq on a no-bid basis, provides 
for the distribution of oil throughout Iraq as well as for the reconstruction of oil facilities that 
would presumably be damaged during combat operations.61 
B. Weighing the Benefits and Risks of U.S. Use of Private Military Contractors 
 Although it is undeniable that the privatization of military services is here to stay for the 
                                                 
53 Dana Priest, Private Guards Repel Attack on U.S Headquarters, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2004, at A01, available at 
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54 Id.   
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time being, the interests and consequences implicated in such a sensitive area of public policy 
demand constant reevaluation of privatization efforts.  Proponents of private military contracting 
usually cite cost reduction and efficiency as reasons to outsource a growing number of activities 
to independent companies.  These advocates argue that by hiring professionals to do discrete 
jobs, U.S. forces may operate at "surge capacity," meaning that the U.S. can rapidly gear up 
personnel and carry out a specific mission for which private contractors have been trained.  In 
describing the concept of surge capacity, Professor Steven Schooner explains: 
You don't have to have a tremendous number of troops stationed at installations 
all over North America waiting for the next big military action.  So if we decide 
to invade Iraq, we can go out and hire contractors, very, very quickly at a rate 
we'd never be able to recruit otherwise.  . . . if you only have to move the troops, 
and you have contractors moving the equipment or contractors taking care of the 
food and the water and the other essential services, you can move your troops 
more quickly and, more importantly, be ready to fight . . . .62 
 
 This line of thinking applies not just to logistical support, but also to other functions 
traditionally thought to be inherently military.  For example, Doug Brooks of the International 
Peace Operations Association suggests that utilizing U.S. military forces to provide protection to 
figures like President Karzai of Afghanistan would be a waste of resources because “you need 
somebody who’s very professional and knows what they're doing and [is] experienced and so on.  
You don't need a Navy SEAL to do that.  There's better jobs for Navy SEALS to do.”63  
 Related to the idea of surge capacity is the argument that using contractors reduces costs 
because of reduced overhead expenses.  When missions are contracted out, the military need not 
provide those workers with the facilities and benefits to which regular soldiers are entitled.  As 
Paul Cerjan explains, “it's cheaper . . . because of what it takes to maintain a soldier on active 
                                                 
62 Interview by FRONTLINE with Steven Schooner, supra note 35.   
63 Interview by FRONTLINE with Doug Brooks, president, International Peace Operations Association (Mar. 22, 
2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/interviews/brooks.html (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2005). 
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duty.”64  Schooner also points out that “the government isn't going to pay pensions for anyone 
working for a contractor in Iraq.”65  Also, in exchange for providing specialized services to the 
government, the contractors themselves  find a way to still utilize their extensive military 
experience and skills, which may not otherwise be marketable to mainstream employers.66     
 An often-overlooked reason for employing private contractors is that this strategy allows 
the U.S. government to provide unofficial aid to certain groups in circumstances where the U.S. 
may fear attracting controversy or violating standards of neutrality.  As previously mentioned, in 
1995 the American company MPRI trained Croatian forces to great success during their struggle 
against the Serbians.67  However, such assistance was in violation of United Nations sanctions 
against the provision of military aid to the Croatians.68  Incidentally, the United States had voted 
to institute those sanctions.69  MPRI also trained members of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) at secret bases in Albania under a Pentagon license, despite the official stance by the U.S. 
government against recognition of the Kosovar independence movement.70  Thus the use of 
private security companies and private military firms has been upheld as a way to transfer skills 
and know-how “in an age when governments do not have the resources or political will to enter 
internal skirmishes or civil wars on behalf of recognized regimes.”71  However, the legitimacy of 
the practice has been attacked as a “clean hands” approach to foreign policy that “appears 
dangerous to those who see transparent nation-state accountability as essential to controlling 
                                                 
64 Interview by FRONTLINE with Paul Cerjan, Vice-President, KBR Worldwide Military Affairs, Camp Victory, Iraq 
(Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/interviews/cerjan.html (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2005).   
65 Interview by FRONTLINE with Steven Schooner, supra note 35.   
66 See Bergner, supra note 11, at 35 (discussing how the talents of some former members of Special Operations 
teams were “going unrecognized and unused when they left the military and entered civilian society.”). 
67 See Garmon, supra note 8, at 336-37.   
68 Id. at 336. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 337. 
71 Zarate, supra note 11, at 116. 
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human rights violations and the type and quality of military activity throughout the world.”72 
 The conflicts that private military contracting generates in the foreign policy context are 
but one example of the misgivings voiced by critics of the current contracting system.  No 
definitive study has shown that the practice actually saves the military any money.73  On the 
other hand, cost-effectiveness may not actually be the primary goal of contracting.  As Schooner 
has maintained, “[s]ometimes the government pays more money for greater flexibility or greater 
capacity or better services that could be provided more quickly.”74  Some evidence supports this 
conclusion; in particular, the U.S. General Accounting Office's (GAO) 2004 audit of the KBR 
LOGCAP contract, which revealed that $88 million dollars of food never was served to military 
personnel.75  Halliburton contended that it was obligated to provide a minimum number of 
meals.76  Even assuming that no fraud was involved, the sheer waste involved indicates a lack of 
proper foresight during the negotiation of that contract.77  Incidentally, a 2003 report prepared by 
the GAO did not even cite cost-effectiveness as a reason for outsourcing to private military 
contractors.78  Nevertheless, the lines between economy, efficiency, and effectiveness oftentimes 
are blurry.  As explained by retired Marine Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, “[w]artime is not about 
efficiency; it's about effectiveness.  The American way of war is ‘We don't care what it costs.  
Let's get it done right and save lives.’ Contracting’s about the most efficient way rather than the 
                                                 
72 Id. at 78. 
73 See Interview by FRONTLINE with Steven Schooner, supra note 35; Deborah Avant, Think Again: Mercenaries, 
FOREIGN POL’Y, July/Aug. 2004, available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2577&print=1. 
74 Interview by FRONTLINE with Steven Schooner, supra note 35.   
75 See FRONTLINE, Who are the Contactors?, supra note 5.   
76 Id.   
77 A settlement eventually was reached in April 2005 wherein the terms of the contract were adjusted for more 
flexibility.  Id. 
78 See Avant, supra note 73.   
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most effective way.”79   
 Another serious concern regarding the use of private military contractors is that 
contractors siphon off talent to the detriment of an already-strained uniformed service.  For 
example, the British American Security Information Council reported in 2004 that just when the 
War on Terror increased government demand for their services, members of Special Forces units 
were flocking to private firms.80  During the same year, senior enlisted advisers from the elite 
contingent testified to Congress that more and more troops were declining to stay past the 
twenty-year mark even though those individuals were still eligible to serve for an additional 
number of years.81  The advisers also noted that the Navy SEALS were experiencing similar 
difficulties; troops that otherwise were satisfied with their work had been leaving the service 
after the ten-year mark in pursuit of more money.82 
 The benefits offered by private military companies are quite competitive: the salary for 
U.S. and Western European security workers averages $400-700 per day.83  Senior company 
personnel earn approximately $20,000 per month, and individuals working in blue-collar 
positions can earn from $80,000-100,000 per year.84  In light of increasing attrition rates, the 
Special Forces have responded by offering $150,000 cash re-enlistment bonuses.85  Unlike full-
time soldiers who remain deployed for extended periods of time, most military contractors only 
                                                 
79 Interview by FRONTLINE with Marine Col. Thomas X. Hammes (Ret.) (Mar. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/interviews/hammes.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2005). 
80 David Isenberg, A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in 
Iraq, BRIT. AM. SECURITY INFO. COUNCIL (Sept. 2004), available at 
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC.pdf. 
81 See Reid Mitenbuler, Private Sector Draw Seen as Biggest SOCOM Personnel Issue, 20 INSIDE THE PENTAGON 
30, July 22, 2004.   
82 Id. 
83 See Bergner, supra note 11, at 34.  Employees from other countries, such as Chile and Fiji, make about $40-150 a 
month.  Id. 
84 See Schmitt, supra note 3, at 515.   
85 See FRONTLINE, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 4.  This unintended consequence perhaps further chips 
away at the notion that privatizing is somehow saving the government money.   
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work for three-month rotations followed by a one-month leave.86  Because their obligations are 
purely contractual, those same contractors may halt operations or break their contracts if they 
decide that conditions have become too dangerous.87  For example, after an ambush on April 9, 
2004, KBR truckers refused to perform their jobs until security conditions improved.88 
 Not only do private military companies compete with the government for talent, but the 
activities of contractors on the ground sometimes undermines the efforts of U.S. military forces.  
Against a backdrop of limited coordination between private and military forces, impropriety and 
misconduct by contractors create negative consequences for uniformed personnel.  As Col. 
Hammes observes, security companies like Blackwater have an interest in protecting their clients 
at all costs, which results in its employees being as “aggressive and as muscular as possible as 
they need to be to fulfill what [the U.S. military] contracted them to do.”89  When Blackwater 
was transporting Ambassador Bremer, it occasionally ran motorists off the road in effort to 
intimidate any would-be assailants, arguably “making enemies each time they went out.”90  Even 
though the contractors may technically be private actors, “whether you like it or not, they 
represent [the U.S. military] – period, end of sentence.  You may think the contractors are a 
separate entity, but to the local population, they're your hired guns.”91   
In a more serious example, an interrogator from the CACI Corporation and two linguists 
from Titan Corporation, none of whom were supervised by contracting officers, were implicated 
in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.92  The allegations of detainee abuse at the military installation 
incited a firestorm of controversy after a government report issued in early 2004 revealed that 
                                                 
86 See Bergner, supra note 11, at 34.   
87 See FRONTLINE, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 4.   
88 Id. 
89 Interview by FRONTLINE with Col. Thomas X. Hammes, supra note 79.   
90 Id. 
91 Id.   
92 See Interview by FRONTLINE with Steven Schooner, supra note 35. 
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military police and intelligence personnel had subjecting captured Iraqis to various forms of 
degrading treatment.93  Although no charges were filed against the contractors, the vulnerability 
of U.S. military personnel to the imputation of the acts of the contractors that serve them is easy 
to fathom.94   
 The concern for contractors’ conduct raises a second inquiry: just who are these contract 
workers, anyway?  Although some companies diligently evaluate their applicants, others have 
been known to hire candidates who may be unqualified or unfit.95  As one contractor with Triple 
Canopy has indicated, “[a]t best you’ve got professionals doing their best in a chaotic and 
aggressive environment.  At worst you've got cowboys running around almost unchecked, 
shooting at will and just plain O.T.F. (Out There Flappin’).”96  That individual had previously 
worked with a colleague who, in addition to fleeing embezzlement charges in Massachusetts, 
once had been convicted of assault for almost shooting a friend’s jaw off while playing Russian 
roulette.97 
 One incident that allegedly took place on May 5, 2004 illustrates both the problem of 
conduct and the problem of contractor identity.98  Fourteen security agents employed by Zapata 
Engineering reported being stopped by U.S. Marines in Fallujah and detained for three days.99  
The Marines accused the guards of firing on civilians and military forces, driving erratically, and 
possessing illegal arms.100  The contractors, who contend that they had only fired warning shots, 
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eventually were released without charge.101  The story’s twist is that the contractors also claim 
that the Marines beat them up and asked, “[h]ow does it feel to be a rich contractor now?”102 
 In addition tension arising from the deployment of two different kinds of forces on the 
ground, private military contracting also may lead to the delegation of sensitive activities to 
unaccountable parties.  Specifically, private contractors may be committing human rights 
violations without being held responsible for their actions, as illustrated by allegations that 
contractors were involved in prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib.103  To some degree individual 
contractors are accountable to the organizations with whom they contract, but “[t]he use of 
contractors to avoid governmental accountability is more worrisome.  . . . Although the U.S. 
Congress approves the military budget, its access to information about contracts is often limited.  
The [P]resident can use this advantage to evade restrictions on U.S. actions, effectively limiting 
congressional checks on foreign policy.”104   
Weak states that hire private military companies are particularly susceptible to undue 
influence from those firms, which in the past actually have won valuable concessions from 
certain African governments in exchange for their services.105  Those concessions, which include 
oil facilities and diamond mines, enable military companies to exert economic control over 
national affairs as “a semi-sovereign force” long after their contracts have expired.106  The fact 
that foreign policy decisions are being removed from the political arena and instead are being 
made by private individuals should concern the entire international community.  
 Despite the lucrative nature of the contracting business, the contractors themselves are 
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subject to an enormous amount of risk when they carry out their missions.107  Private contractors 
make up the second-largest number of casualties in Iraq, second only to U.S. forces and 
outstripping the losses suffered by the next-largest military contingent, the British.108  As of 
November 13, 2005, the Brookings Institution placed the contractor death toll at 280, counting 
back from August 2003 and leaving out an additional forty-four contractors whose deaths could 
not be traced to a specific month.109  By contrast, ninety-seven British troops have died since the 
invasion in March 2003.110  Because contractors are not part of regular military forces, their 
death tolls often are ignored, thus “artificially deflat[ing] the human cost of . . . involvement in 
Iraq.”111  The risks also are palpable elsewhere.  In February 2003, Colombian guerillas captured 
three U.S. government contract employees when the contractors’ military intelligence plane 
crashed into rebel territory.112  Because the legal status of the contractors is unclear, neither the 
U.S. nor the Colombian government has taken action, and the hostages remain in captivity to this 
day.113 
 One response to these concerns is that the market should be trusted to correct anomalies 
in the contracting process.  Arguably, because private military contractors are registered 
corporations, the contractors in fact are subject to some degree of state oversight.114  Companies 
also have an incentive to act reasonably abroad because the contractors are dependent on the 
government for contracts, with most being repeat players.115  In essence, the market should weed 
out those contractors that habitually engage in misconduct and undermine the goals of the U.S. 
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government.116  Additionally, companies working for foreign clients can be valuable sources of 
intelligence for their home governments, as was the case when the South African military 
company Executive Outcomes provided information to the Mandela administration regarding 
activities in Sierra Leone and Angola.117   
 The question remains whether the activities of private military contractors simply carry 
out U.S. policy or in fact influence it.  In 2001, ten prominent contracting firms expended over 
$32 million on U.S. lobbying efforts and shelled out more than $12 million in political campaign 
contributions.118  The leading donors were Halliburton and DynCorp, with the former spending 
95 percent of its $700,000 total on Republicans and the latter spending 72 percent of its $500,000 
on G.O.P. as well.119  More recently, Titan Corp. and CACI Corp., the two firms whose 
employees were implicated in the Abu Ghraib scandal, have been accused of lobbying senators 
into rejecting a proposed amendment to the 2005 defense authorization bill that would have 
banned private contractors from performing or translating detainee interrogations at U.S. military 
installations.120   
III. REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
 While the litany of flaws in the private military contracting system makes a complete ban 
on military contracting appear to be the simplest solution, the current state of affairs indicates 
that the U.S. government simply is too dependent on civilian assistance,121 rendering any blanket 
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prohibition on outsourcing impractical and unlikely.122  Rather, regulation of the contracting 
industry appears to be the most feasible alternative and one that has been vigorously supported 
by the contracting companies themselves, demonstrating the contractors’ eagerness to strengthen 
their legitimacy and shed the stigma of mercernarism.123  As revealed by the problems in Iraq, 
however, the current regulatory scheme has failed to properly coordinate civilian and military 
efforts on the ground, and doubts about accountability for contractor misconduct remain.124  
Accordingly, more robust measures that guarantee transparency and oversight are needed to fill 
in the remaining regulatory holes. 
 The ideal solution would involve a multinational effort that takes account of the 
inherently global character of military contracting.  Several international conventions ban 
mercenary groups, but these documents do not cover most private military contractors like the 
ones currently working in Iraq.  These existing agreements only apply to increasingly antiquated 
“classic soldier-of-fortune activities” 125 such as overthrowing a government or aiding a “colonial 
or racist” regime.126   
One popular proposal is the establishment of an international registration regime that not 
only determines the initial qualifications for registration but also allows for auditing of military 
firms to ensure their compliance with fair business practices and international military 
standards.127  This “clearing for business” would perhaps be done by the U.N. Secretary 
General’s Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism.128  In the alternative, the British American 
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Security Information Council recommends the extension of the International Court of Justice to 
contractor activities, the negotiation of a “Convention on the Use of Armed Non-Military 
Contractors by an Occupying Force,” and the creation of common standards through the 
harmonization of domestic laws.129 
Army lawyer Major Todd S. Milliard has combined several of these solutions into a 
proposed international convention dubbed “The International Convention to Prevent the 
Unlawful Transfer of Military Services to Foreign Armed Forces.”130  The draft calls for the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to oversee all 
lawful military transfers and to issue minimal guidelines that each member state must enforce 
under domestic laws and regulations.131  Lawful military transfers include the transfer of training 
or direct assistance under an agreement between two states or between a receiving state and a 
military provider duly licensed in the sending state.132  The OHCHR also would maintain a 
database of licensed contractors, would receive a copy of all contracts and would immediately 
notify member states of any credible evidence concerning human rights violations committed by 
those states’ licensed military providers.133  Under the proposed convention, member states that 
did not establish domestic measures to prosecute the unlawful transfer of military services would 
be subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.134 
Unfortunately, perhaps, “the biggest obstacle to doing anything internationally is a lack 
of political will.”135  Indeed, considering the current international political climate, it is unlikely 
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that a workable convention can be negotiated within a reasonable time frame, if ever.  Consensus 
on even fairly routine matters of commercial law can take years to develop.  The regulation of 
military contracting, an area where economically-advanced countries provide services to 
developing countries, would require many countries with diverging interests to come to a 
consensus.  Such global unity appears far from achievable.  
Because the United States and Great Britain are major exporters of military services, 
internal regulation ought to be the most effective solution.  One significant loophole in U.S. law 
that must be closed involves the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) implemented 
pursuant to the U.S. Arms Export Control Act, which licenses the export of arms and military 
services.136  Although ITAR requires congressional approval of military contracts that exceed 
$50 million, most contracts are negotiated for much less.137  Furthermore, larger contracts can be 
broken up into smaller ones in order to evade the notice requirement.138  One start-up company, 
Triple Canopy, managed to avoid jurisdiction under the Act altogether by getting permission 
from the Department of Defense to go straight to Iraq and salvage captured AK-47s rather than 
purchasing the weapons and shipping them from the United States.139  Aside from that particular 
circumvention, the loopholes in ITAR should be relatively easy to close just by lowering the 
minimum amount required for approval and consolidating all related contracts for purposes of 
calculating the total contract value. 
One area in need of regulation is contractor hiring, because private military contactors 
vary in the scope of background checks they conduct on potential employees.  While many 
contractors are former military personnel that come into the private sector with years of 
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experience, some firms concede that a substantial portion of their employees have no military 
training.140  The lack of uniform criminal background checks or psychological profiling within 
the hiring practices of different companies is troubling from a human rights perspective.  In order 
to prevent unqualified or unfit individuals from carrying out missions within war zones or other 
places experiencing war-like conditions, licensing requirements should include mandatory 
investigations of employees similar to those utilized in obtaining security clearances for certain 
government jobs. 
When contractor misconduct occurs, an effective adjudication process should be 
available to punish those who commit human rights abuses in the host country.  Interpretation of 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, which gives aliens the right to sue in U.S. federal court for human 
rights violations, has been expanded in the last two decades to cover more than just visiting 
diplomats who suffer violations on U.S. soil; the Act now covers activities in foreign countries as 
in the United States.141  Although these developments may allow U.S. courts to hold private 
military contractors liable for misconduct committed abroad, defendants nonetheless may prevail 
using a variety of tools at their disposal, including: forum non conveniens, lack of standing, 
failure to join indispensable parties, and a ten-year statute of limitations.142   
A more promising remedy comes in the form of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Act (MEJA), a 2000 law that gives U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
persons employed with or accompanying the armed forces abroad, including contractors with the 
                                                 
140 See Schmitt, supra note 3, at 515. 
141 See Stinnett, supra note 12, at 217.  See also Garmon, supra note 8, at 339-40 (discussing Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 
630 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding federal jurisdiction over claims of torture that allegedly occurred in 
Paraguay); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding Ford liable for using slave labor 
during World War II)).   
142 See Stinnett, supra note 12, at 221. 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 80 (2006). 
Department of Defense (DOD).143  However, as originally passed, the MEJA was narrow in its 
sole reference to the DOD.  Contractors affiliated with other agencies, such as the personnel 
working at Abu Ghraib under contract with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 
Department of the Interior, were not covered under MEJA.144  In the wake of the Abu Ghraib 
scandal, Congress hastily amended the MEJA to extend jurisdiction over workers connected with 
other federal agencies and those contracting with “any provisional authority.”145  These 
legislative efforts represent a positive step towards ensuring contractor accountability, but one 
significant loophole still remains.  The MEJA does not account for persons who contract with 
foreign governments, a problematic omission considering that coalition forces have handed over 
sovereignty to the Iraqis while the march of reconstruction will continue for years to come.146  
Unfortunately, no legislative history exists to explain the language of the amendment.147 
Although legal accountability is necessary to address misconduct and impropriety by 
private military contractors, adjudication only occurs when abuse already has happened.  
Authorities therefore should take a preventative approach to ensure that contractors who 
unofficially represent the U.S. abroad comport with internationally accepted standards of 
behavior.  A serious reassessment of the U.S. military’s outsourcing policies is needed to identify 
the tasks that can and cannot be delegated to civilians.  In addition to strengthening the criteria 
allowing for U.S. security companies to work abroad, sensitive tasks should be performed only 
by U. S. military personnel.  In particular, the use of private contractors in interrogation violates 
an Army policy that requires government employees to carry out functions that implicate 
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national security concerns.148  Because the commission of human rights violations not only 
contravenes basic moral standards but may also undermine counter-insurgency efforts, the use of 
contractors should be limited to situations where the government truly is dependent on civilian 
expertise or to “mundane, repetitive tasks that are clearly defined with a legal structure.”149   
CONCLUSION 
 Private military contracting has become more common in recent decades due to a 
confluence of economic, political and social factors.  The current state of the American armed 
forces indicates that civilians will continue to play a large role in carrying out the U.S. military’s 
missions in the years to come.  However, a lack of coordination and effective regulation will 
continue to pose problems for the military as more and more private contractors fulfill roles 
previously performed by the United States military.  This delegation need not pose a significant 
problem if stricter requirements in licensing and accountability are instituted.  A multinational 
effort to regulate the activities of private military contractors is ideal, but the political climate 
probably will deter any timely, meaningful consensus on the matter.  The United States therefore 
must enact and enforce the necessary measures.  Furthermore, sensitive tasks that implicate 
issues of national security should be performed solely by trained U.S. military personnel.  These 
proposals will ensure that civilians assisting the military will be held responsible for deviations 
from the basic standards that their military counterparts are obliged to uphold.   
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